What Clausewitz Knew
Clausewitz … experienced years of intense and bitter conflict, first in the crushing defeat in 1806, then in the grueling retreat into the Russian interior, and finally fighting to Napoleon’s defeat in the Hundred Days. He therefore spent his years of active service grappling with the problem of facing a superior enemy, and sought to study war in a way that was useful both for someone with the talent of Napoleon, and for someone who had the unenviable task of facing him. Clausewitz’s experiences with real war served as a reminder of how much of one’s exertions were required to merely avert disaster, and of how infrequently opportunities for great victories were granted.
The defeat of 1806 and the role it played in Clausewitz’s thought is something that separates him from (American theorist and fighter pilot John) Boyd. The challenge Boyd sought to address was how the US had failed in Vietnam, despite vastly superior means. Clausewitz grappled with the question of what Prussia ought to have done in 1806, when facing Napoleon with an outdated and inferior army. His theory is thus concerned as much with avoiding disaster, as seeking great success. In both cases, he finds boldness, moral courage, to be at the core. Whether one has the superiority needed for a stunning victory, or are merely attempting to ward off a crushing defeat, in both cases one must seize upon the best chance at success, and not be dissuaded by the immediate ease of other courses that are less promising.
Kiran Pfitzner, The Further Misconceptions of John Boyd, 7 April 2026 (warning: Substack)
I got this for my recent birthday.
https://www.abebooks.co.uk/Man-Who-Broke-Napoleons-Codes-Story/20898139033/bd
Until I read it I hadn’t realised just how cautious a general Wellington was. Then I realised: there was only one British (or, rather British/Portuguese) army. Lose one battle and it’s all over – all they could have done was run for the coast in hopes of being evacuated (as had happened a few years earlier for Moore’s army at Corunna).
Whereas Napoleon had five armies in the peninsula alone. So Wellington’s preference for fighting defensive battles on ground he got to choose was pretty sound.
But I dare say you knew this already.
I should read a full history of the Peninsular War, maybe a new one and the beautiful Charles Oman writing. I visited Jena-Auerstadt where the French crushed two Prussian armies almost by accident (one detachment marched into a Prussian detachment, fighting broke out, and before help arrived they had beaten half the Prussian army and the main force with Napoleon had beaten the other half).
Lots of people find the OODA loop helpful but its unfortunate that Boyd never turned his white papers and presentations into a full treatise. Keegan also had rants about Clausewitz despite by his own admission not having read him since he first went to university.